Two principals engage in Hotelling competition for an agent's services under incomplete information as to her outside option (location). This renders the agent's participation decision probabilistic from the perspective of each principal. Regardless of the market structure at equilibrium the optimal contract features a trade-off between participation probability and incentives. Rent and effort are inversely related and non-monotonic in the agent's transport cost and so in market structures; they increase (decrease) with competition. Uncertainty as to the agent's location may increase or decrease the rent compared to full information. This correspondingly harms or benefits principals. at equilibrium the optimal contract features a trade-off between participation probability and incentives. Rent and effort are inversely related and non-monotonic in the agent's transport cost and so in market structures; they increase (decrease) with competition. Uncertainty as to the agent's location may increase or decrease the rent compared to full information. This correspondingly harms or benefits principals.
Introduction
The canonical model of moral hazard takes the agent's outside option as exogenous and known to the principal designing the incentive contract. Assuming so is natural to focus attention on the incentive problem, which is then the sole source of frictions.
This assumption does not match most situations. In the labor market for example an employer must overcome both the "compensating differential" (see for example Rosen, 1983 ) and the terms of any competing offer. 1 It is easy to argue that in most cases that information is private to the prospective employee. We see this routinely in academic recruiting, where new hires have idiosyncratic preferences. Some people refuse to work for tobacco manufacturers or for defense contractors on ethical grounds. Overcoming this compensating differential can be costly: when he was hired away from Royal Bank of Scotland by Westpac (an Australian bank) CEO Brian Hartzer was reportedly paid a lump-sum of $7M to be lured.
Casting aside the question of participation is not without loss because the participation decision interacts with the incentives through wealth effects. That is, information about the agent's outside option has a bearing on the optimal contract. A new participation-incentive trade-off emerges, with consequences for the power of incentives and therefore the optimal action.
To introduce competition and uncertainty I embed a principal-agent problem in a Hotelling model. Principals are located at the extremes of an interval containing a single agent whose location is her private information. The Hotelling structure allows for the interpretation of the total transport cost (distance × unit cost) as the compensating differential. Alternatively the distance between the agent and a principal can be interpreted as the degree of fitness of a match.
A better match is more productive here because it allows for stronger incentives to be offered.
The participation-incentive trade-off arises because how important it is to secure participation depends on the principals' expected payoff -not on the agent's exogenous outside option. To transfer utility to the agent most efficiently principals improve the insurance properties of the contract. Inframarginal types respond by selecting a lower action than they otherwise would, which entails a social cost. This connection between insurance and effort underpins most results.
When principals compete even the marginal agent receives a rent, and increasing competition exacerbates rent-giving: the (endogenous) outside option of the agent increases, and the principals must offer more. This also induces weaker incentives through the insurance effect. Hence with more substitutable, or with more profitable, principals, the agent receives a higher rent and works less. This is reminiscent of the dot-com bubble of the late 1990's, when firms competed for workers for very little effort in return. 2 To counter this costly rent-giving employers, if they could, should 2 Witness "tolinrome"'s (a pseudo) account: "Everyday we had catered lunches, I mean nice stuff [...] IT employees had their DSL bills paid every month and they paid for everyone's cell phone [...] . They even flew me twice to HQ in SF for a meeting and paid everything [...] I worked about 2 hours a day and spent the rest of the time cruising around SF. Another time we had an IT meeting there, flew me out again, stayed at a ranch in Napa valley area, horseback riding, spa, everything." Source: http://techtalk.dice.com/t5/Off-Topic-Other-Archive/Crazy-emphasize differentiation.
Incomplete information has ambiguous effects on rents and effort that depend on the agent's location. When she is very contestable, incomplete information tames Bertrand competition for the agent because the participation-incentive trade-off caps rent-giving. So if they could, firm should commit to remain ignorant of the worker's outside option some of the time. Conversely, a principal cannot take advantage of the agent's proximity and offer a "cheap" contract; the participationincentive trade-off, not the actual location, pins the marginal participating type.
The optimal action is non-monotonic in the transport cost. For a high transport cost the principals operate as local monopolists; the outside option is high and renders effort costly. Participation mechanically increases as the transport cost drops, which modifies the participation-incentive tradeoff; the cost of effort decreases. Incentives become stronger, until principals start competing. At that point the marginal type becomes increasingly contestable and is thus able to extract an increasing rent; then effort drops. To return to the introductory application, both compensating differential and competing offer(s) matter, depending on the equilibrium market structure. This paper belongs to the broad literature on moral hazard (Mirrlees, 1975; Holmström, 1977 Holmström, , 1979 Rogerson, 1985b; Page, 1987; Jewitt, 1988; Conlon, 2008 Conlon, , 2009 ). More closely related is the work of Kadan and Swinkels (2010) , who study a principal's incentives to alter the agent's action as payment constraints vary. Their principal employs more than one agent whose reservation utilities are observable. The participation problem is standard but with more than one agent, the principal may either ask less effort of everyone, or employ fewer people and ask more effort of them. The single-agent framework neutralizes these incentive problems and focuses on participation.
I purposefully do not adopt a model of common agency (Aubert,2005; Célérier, 2012). Common agency drastically modifies the principals' incentives in their contract offers, and therefore the agent's action in response. In Bisin and Guaitoli's work (2004) competing principals may offer contracts that induce the low action in equilibrium; they feature full insurance and generate zero profit. Principals may induce the high action and secure positive profits by also offering latent contracts that are not active in equilibrium. These latent contracts deter the other principals from offering more attractive contracts. Attar et al (2006 Attar et al ( , 2007a Attar et al ( , 2007b show that restricting attention to take-it-or-leave-it offers in such a context entails a loss of generality. Exclusive contracting (here) stories-from-the-dotcom-peak/td-p/128704 allows for take-it-or-leave-it offers and affords a clean characterization. Parlan and Rajan (2001) also study common agency however without asymmetric information; instead failure is strategic.
The incentives of agents to engage in strategic failure weakens the principals' incentives to compete for agents; it breaks the Bertrand logic. Here the Bertrand logic is broken by the participationincentive trade off.
There is a burgeoning literature on moral hazard in a market context (Besley and Serfes, 2008; Terviö, 2008) . All these papers feature heterogenous agents, an assignment problem and no private information. A good match is important because agent's characteristics affects their productivity; for each (publicly observable) type there exists an optimal contract. Through competitive matching an agent's outside option is given by the next best match -the competing offer in this paper. But here heterogeneity is orthogonal to productivity so types cannot be screened and heterogeneity does not enter the incentive problem. This paper also departs from Besley and Ghatak (2005) precisely because the agent's type affects her outside option but not her productivity. Serfes (2008) and Dam and Pérez-Castrillo (2006) show that identical principals obtain identical profits (zero when the market is short on agents). Here the principals always receive ex ante positive profits under uncertainty thanks to the participation-incentive trade-off, even though the market is always short on agents.
As in Jullien (2000) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) the outside option is type dependent.
But it does not affect the agent's production technology, and so does not directly affect incentives. This paper also bears an obvious connection to the work of Rochet and Stole (2002) , who study random outside option under adverse selection. Further discussion of the relation between their work and this one is postponed to Section 5.
Model
Description. There are two principals, P 0 and P 1 , located at the extremes of an interval of length 1, and a lone agent who can contract with at most one principal. Throughout I assume that the conditions of the first-order approach (FOA) hold -see Jewitt (1988) .
In particular, u and u ′ do not diverge -see Moroni and Swinkels (2014) . 
The outside option generated is private to the agent and treated as a random variable (by the principals). For large enough γ, the principals do not compete for the agent at equilibrium; the market is not covered in equilibrium. The agent may work for either principal or not at all. For γ small enough, the principals do compete for the agent's services; the market is covered and the contracts are best response to each other; they form a Nash equilibrium.
This formulation allows for competition only at the participation stage; it nests three models including the Holmström (1979) model when d is known. Let the linear functionals 
Remark 1 In the standard model the optimal action is decreasing in the outside optionū. 4 
Analysis
Letd denote the marginal participating agent. The agent's participation decision defines a random variable: the participation constraint is satisfied with probability
Re-arranging a pair of inequalities,
The objective function includes the stochastic participation decision and is non-monotone concave, unlike the standard problem. 5 This is depicted in Figure 1 , where the horizontal axis represents an increase in t for any q. In the standard problem (left), increasing t is a strict cost for the principal;
here (right) it increases the participation probability up to a point -hence non-monotonicity.
Principals are local monopolists whenever γ > U 0 + U 1 ; otherwise there is competition at equilibrium. Which of these inequalities holds is determined in equilibrium. For now I study each case in turn and postpone that other question. 4 Proof upon request; in the same spirit as that of Proposition 1. 
Local monopolies
Since only one firm is considered in this section I drop the subscripts. The one complication is whether the marginal participating agentd sits at location 1 or strictly below. The solution turns out to be continuous all the way tod = 1. In what follows I lay out P 0 's problem in either case.
The second line comes directly from Problem 1. The first one features
at that point any agent participates so the rent should be capped at U (t, a) = γ ·d = γ. Attach
Lagrange multiplier λ to that constraint; maximizing with respect to a always yields
almost as in the standard problem (and where G(U (t, a)/γ) may be 1). Because g(·) is log-concave, so is G(·); with δU (t, a) > 0 and δπ(t) < 0, the second-order condition is immediately verified.
Next maximizing pointwise with respect to t one has 6
where
The first line is as the standard case. The second equality defines a fixed-point problem in a space T of functions defined on Q. The solution, if it exists, is the transfer function t(q). It turns out to be less problematic than at first glance. The new term
is a linear functional from T to R. So for a given action a, the first-order
which now resembles the standard Condition (2.1). 7 Recalling that U (t, a)/γ =d, 
The solution is continuous atd = 1, i.e.
The principal faces a trade-off between incentives and participation. This trade-off is captured by
and is depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 1 . When the solution is interior (i ) participation is not guaranteed, even if it is profitable to the principal (who would benefit from more information to increase it) and (ii ) the expected marginal benefits of the principal and the agent are equalized. That is,
where the right-hand side is the expected marginal benefit to the principal of increasing t,
the expected marginal cost. In the standard problem
the marginal cost is equated to the agent's opportunity cost, regardless of the principal's benefit. Uncertainty about the agent's outside option restores some bargaining power. .2)).
The principal induces a lower action from inframarginal types than if their outside option were known and they were offered the corresponding optimal contract. Their incentives are too weak.
Increasing the probability G (U (t, a)/γ ≥ d) of acceptance requires increasing the induced expected utility U (t, a). The principal transfers utility most cheaply to the risk-averse agent by improving the insurance properties of the contract -not just to by increasing the transfer. To improve insurance he increases t in low-income states (where f a < 0) and decreases it in high-income states (where
. 8 This is bad for incentives. The expected utility U (t M , a M ) just satisfies typed but entails excessive insurance for all others accepting the contract. The principal would benefit from information about the agent's type to provide stronger incentives.
Competitive setting
When γ is low enough the principals compete for the marginal agent who is identified by the standard condition d = (γ + U 0 − U 1 )/2γ: the outside option is the (endogenous) competitor's offer. Without loss I seek a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the contract game. 9 P 0 solves Problem 3
Because the agent chooses a, after agreeing to participate, subgame perfection in a immediately yields the envelope condition (3.2) -up to the exact definition of d. Optimizing with respect to the transfer gives the best response 6) and similarly for P 1 . By extension of Theorem 1 (in the Appendix) a solution to (3.6) exists.
8 U is concave: take a variation with respect to t : u ′ f > 0 (with the envelope condition Ua = 0) and u ′′ f < 0. 9 There exists a unique equilibrium of this game; strict diagonal concavity of the objective function is satisfied (Rosen, 1965) . Proof upon request.
Proposition 2
In the unique, symmetric Nash equilibrium of the contract game, for each principal, the equilibrium contracts are characterized by (a C , t C ) such that
The contract commits a fixed share g (1/2) /γ of the principal's profits π to the agent. 10 The competitor's offer depends on γ, which parametrizes the intensity of competition. Participation remains stochastic, so the participation-incentive trade-off remains. Because contracting is exclusive
of the best reply is substantively unchanged.
Equilibrium market structure
Whether the principals compete depends on γ. For any economy (Q, c(·), F (q|a)), there exists a critical value of γ such that
where 1/2 is the location of the agent that is just attracted under either regime. Let this relation identify γ * . For γ ≤ γ * competition prevails; otherwise either principal is a monopolist. As shown in Proposition 2 the transition is smooth.
Information, market structure and outcomes
Effort may vary according to the information structure as well as market structure. I study each in turn, beginning with the impact of uncertainty in a (imperfectly) competitive market.
The impact of uncertainty
If d were known principals would engage in Bertrand competition for the agent. This process
; so the agent would always contract with the principal closest to her. Let U 1 denote the level of utility such that π 1 (U 1 ) = 0; this is the most utility P 1 can bestow to the agent. Let d 0 (γ) the corresponding type; it is defined by the relation On Figure 2 we see that whend > 1/2, P ′ 0 s profit under complete information is naught, the the expected profit (π N ) under incomplete information is positive. The complete-information profit Figure 2 : profit functions and thresholds across regimes
increases when the agent is closer to P 0 
Market structure, rent and action
Here I attempt to understand how participation levels and effort behave as γ varies over wide enough a range for either monopoly or duopoly to arise in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 The participation probability G(d) increases as γ decreases and G(d)
The rent is U-shaped and the effort hump-shaped in γ; they, respectively,
• decreases (increases) as γ increases towards γ * (under competition); and • increases (decreases) beyond γ * (under monopoly).
Under monopoly a lower γ has two effects. First there is a direct effect: fix the contract (fix U 0 ), decreasing γ mechanically increases the participation probability G(U 0 /γ). This is the market share effect (extensive margin). As participation increases exogenously through the market share effect, the principal offers a steeper contract that induces a higher action. This is the second effect -the margin effect (intensive margin). More can be demanded from the agent because the cost of any action decreases.
As γ keeps decreasing below γ * , one switches to the competitive regime. In equilibrium, the exogenous market share effect disappears altogether (see Condition (3.8)). In response to competition rents must increase in the form of a lower-power contract to secure participation (from the marginal agent). A natural implication is that when agents are more contestable principals should differentiate more to preserve the incentive power of monetary transfers.
Welfare implications
The impact of uncertainty on welfare is not entirely obvious prima facie. The principal is effortconstrained: µ M , µ C > 0 so that he would like a higher action. However the optimal contract presents the risk-averse agent with better insurance, at the cost of a lower action. Letd 0 ,d 1 denote the marginal participating types with P 0 , P 1 (d 0 =d 1 = 1/2 under competition). Let social welfare
The first two terms are the expected joint payoff from the relationship with either principal, if it is entered into; the last one is the value of the exogenous outside option if no contract is accepted. 
Discussion
Screening. Menus of contract cannot make the principal better off in this model. Consider a single principal who uses a direct revelation mechanism to elicit the agent's private information of the form (t(q;ū), a(ū)). Denote byũ be the agent's private information (type) and byû her message. Truthful revelation requires U (t(·;ũ), a(ũ);ũ) ≥ U (t(·;û), a(û);ũ) , ∀ũ,û. Equivalently the agent solvesû ∈ arg maxū ∈U 0 U (t(·;û), a(û);ũ); taking a variation ∆tū of t w.r.t.ū atû =ũ,
By (3.1), U a = 0 and u ′ (t(q))f (q|a) > 0; so truthful revelation requires ∆tū|ũ = 0. There can be no discrimination on the basis of the outside option.
Proposition 6 A menu of contracts contingent on the agent's outside option cannot do better than the non-linear contract given by (3.2) and (3.3).
There is no direct connection between the agent's type and her technology (F (q|a), c(a)), so the output q is not informative of the type. The single-crossing property does not hold -this is the first term of (5.1). 11 A stochastic mechanism also does not help, for the same reason. Truthful revelation requires some ex post observability ofū, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
11 The single-crossing condition is lost in a broad sense: the game is not even supermodular. Upon accepting the contract the agent's problem (i.e. (3.1) ) is unchanged. The principal solves
Connection to Rochet and Stole (2002). These authors (now RS
whence β = 1/(1 + rcσ 2 ); the stochastic nature of the outside option has no consequences on incentives. This outcome owes precisely to that specification, which neutralizes wealth effects. The agent's optimal action defined as a = β/c is independent of level of utility; therefore the equilibrium slope parameter β is independent ofū. This is clearly not true according to the standard condition
, and even less in the FOCs (3.3) and (3.8). The CARA specification understates the importance of the participation problem.
Conclusion
This paper presents a model of contracting under moral hazard when the agent's outside option is unknown to principals competingà la Hotelling. The model captures both imperfect principal competition and a stochastic outside option. While in the standard model the agent always or never participates, here she does with a non-degenerate probability. With a risk-averse agent increasing the participation probability is best achieved by offering her better insurance; that is, incentives are necessarily weakened.
Asymmetric information turns out to help competing principals when the agent is highly contestable, that is, when principals must transfer a large fraction of surplus. Because the optimal contract entails a trade-off between incentives and participation, it guarantees that principals do not transfer all the surplus to the agent. The agent's rent is capped and the incentives are not completely diluted. The equilibrium action is also responsive to the market structure. It is nonmonotonic in the Hotelling "transportation cost". Common agency, where the agent may enter into multiple contracts, is left for future research.
Appendix

A Additional material
A.1 Elements of the construction of Theorem 1
The basic idea is to view the first-order conditions as Kuhn-Tucker conditions rather than a fixedpoint problem. The proofs of Lemmata 2-4 are available upon request. 
Lemma 1 Suppose the outside optionū is known to the principal. A transfer function t S (·) is optimal if and only if it takes the form defined in (2.1) for multipliers
λ S , µ S ≥ 0, with U a = 0, U (t,E q [ u • (u ′ ) −1 ( 1 λ S + µ S f fa )] =ū + c(a) (A.1) E q [ u • (u ′ ) −1 ( 1 λ S + µ S fa f ) f a f ] = c ′ (a) (A.2)
Lemma 2 Fix a. λ[ū; a] is increasing inū.
Proof:
is an increasing function of λ S , therefore so is the LHS of the first equation. It follows that λ S [ū; a] is increasing.
At a solution the multiplier µ S is strictly positive.
Uaa defines now a(ū). Thus,
Lemma 3 Givenū, a solution is a tuple
For a givenū a solution exists (Lemma 1) and can be computed (Lemma 3). The optimal transfer is then given by Condition (??). Condition (B.1) pins the value of d -the marginal agent.
Lemma 4 The multiplier µ M of Condition (3.3) is strictly positive.
A.2 A useful Lemma
The following will be useful to prove Propositions 4 and 5.
Lemma 5 In the competitive setting under incomplete information effort decreases in the intensity
of competition γ, i.e. da i /dγ > 0, i = 0, 1. , a) be the maximum of the Lagrangean of Problem 3 under this contract; that is, L a (γ, a C ) = 0. Everything is clearly continuous and differentiable. Thus
and I need to show
. It is easier to work with the conditions of the problem of the agent, namely U a = 0. 12 The identity
where ∆t denotes a variation in t with respect to γ : ∆t = lim
and U aa < 0. So the sign of da/dγ follows that of the first term. In that first term the action a remains constant. 12 When the principal would like the agent to increase her effort, so would the agent -with the appropriate incentive.
In Problem 3 the moral hazard constraint (3.1) implies that a
and the multiplier µ is positive. Because U 0 and U 1 are strategic complements they both decrease as γ increases. One can construct an alternative transfer t(q) such that 
where the penultimate line comes from the moral hazard constraint under γ 1 . The last line uses
) > 0 and fa f < 0 to the left ofq, and conversely to its right. So under t[γ 2 ](q) the agent would rather pick a higher action, and it is cheaper to the principals.
Hence da/dγ > 0.
B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: For completeness, the second line of Condition (3.3) is obtained from the a) is a linear functional -and so pointwise differentiable. Re-arrange, divide by f, u ′ and G and set µ = µ G . Next, 
, in the first instance; and
The function u ′ is continuous and monotone, therefore so is 1/u ′ , and ∫ Q dx is a bounded (so, continuous) operator. Therefore, letting t α denote the transfer whend < 1,
, which is immediate.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Here I show that for any d <d the total cost of inducing an action is lower. For the standard problem, Jewitt has shown in two unpublished papers (1997, 2007 ) that the cost of an action defined as
with Lagrangian function L and multipliers λ, µ has a dual representation
In the present problem, write
where α, µ are defined in equation (3.3) . So α, µ are increasing in d (by Lemma 2) . To show C(a)
is increasing in d, rewrite it in three parts:
Take a partial derivative with respect to d; the last term is 0, and 
and similarly for Principal P 1 . At a symmetric equilibrium, U 0 = U 1 , so that d = 1/2, which yields Conditions (3.7) and (3.8).
Similarly to the monopoly case hitting the boundaryd = 1, there is a regime switch at d = 1/2.
It is isomorphic to the monopoly problem. More precisely, restate Problem 2 withd = 1/2, so that the constraint is U (t, a) = γ ·d = γ/2; the first-order condition is
Integrating over Q, depending on γ, we may have Lettingū ≡ U 1 − γ · (1 − 2d), P 0 's problem is again the standard problem, however the level of utility U 0 that must be offered under complete information depends on the location of the agent.
It is helpful to understand the behaviour of π 0 (U 0 ) asd changes. 
where T (a) ≡ ∫ t(x)dF (x|a) is known to be an increasing, concave function (Conlon, 2008) 
